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Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation
Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits
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Joshua R. Furman*
A recent advertising campaign by a national Internet Service
Provider (ISP) depicts a happy home of consumers who never have to
leave their house thanks to their super-fast connection and the won-
ders of limitless shopping on the web. Television spots show people
in awe over the selection and convenience as they click away at laptops
purchasing kitchen appliances, trading stocks, and occasionally greet-
ing a courier with the latest treat materializing from their online ad-
ventures. In some ways these ads are a fanciful depiction of our cur-
rent reality. While many of us have felt the excitement of a dot com
shipment just a few clicks away, the seamless function of technology
and infrastructure depicted is probably a bit more idealized than we
would recall. However, as we move closer to a society in which online
activities increasingly usurp real world activities, we must ask whether
fundamental rights will follow.
Consider the problem of John Doe, a member of our utopian cy-
ber-shopping household, who wants to comment on a web forum
* J.D. Candidate 2002, Seattle University School of Law. Innumerable thanks are due to the
staff of Seattle University Law Review whose commitment to enriching the legal community
through exceptional scholarship is unparalleled. Many individuals have been of indispensable
assistance in transforming this article from scraps on my hard drive to a printed reality. I would
particularly like to thank Deirdre Mulligan and Alan B. Davidson as well as the entire staff at the
Center for Democracy and Technology for their inspiration and example and Megan E. Gray at
Baker & Hostetler Los Angeles for her comments and generous assistance with materials. Any
spark of genius that the reader may be able to sift out of this piece is undoubtedly due to their
contributions, while the copious errors glaring from every line are entirely my doing. Finally, to
my family and friends who have stood with me throughout these trying times-my love and
gratitude.
Seattle University Law Review
about an issue of public interest. Whether it is the stock of a publicly-
traded company, a public figure, or a government official like a judge,
when John Doe sends a critical anonymous post to the forum, he has
just opened himself up to having his identity revealed to the object of
his criticism. The company or individual need only file a defamation
suit (with merit or otherwise) and proceed with discovery. It becomes
readily apparent that when a netizen like John Doe wants to partici-
pate in an anonymous online discussion about an issue of public inter-
est, he does so without the benefit of certain fundamental rights: free
speech, privacy, or due process. This chills online speech, thus un-
dermining the democratizing nature of the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
"[The Internet is] the most participatory form of mass speech yet
developed." ' Unfortunately, attacks on individual privacy in the
courts threaten to chill participation in online speech. While all major
online service organizations assure their subscribers that personally
identifiable information is kept in some degree of confidence, such as-
surances must fail in the face of a court-ordered subpoena. Addition-
ally, many companies disclose subscriber information without a court
order: a civil plaintiff attorney's subpoena or request will often suffice.
Often, subpoenas are served pursuant to lawsuits filed for the primary
purpose of uncovering an individual's identity.2
Threats to individual privacy and speech online have recently
been stressed in so-called cybersmear lawsuits.3 These are defamation
suits brought by companies against individuals who make disparaging
remarks about a company on Internet discussion fora.4 The processes,
results, and consequences of cybersmear litigation serve as a touch-
stone for the issues presented by abuse of civil discovery against online
John Does.
1. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (citing the lower court decision) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
2. David L. Sobel, The Process That "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to
Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, 2 (2000) ("[C]ivil litigants are increasingly using the
discovery process to pierce the veil of online anonymity.").
3. Id.; Donna Demac, Cybersmears and Consumer Revenge Dot Corn: Corporate Threats to
Online Free Speech (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.ncac.org/issues/cybersmears.html. See
also J. Doe's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Quash Subpoena Issued to Silicon Investor/InfoSpace,
Inc., In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Securities Litigation (C.D. Cal. 2001) (No. SACV-9901127),
available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/ISSUES/privacy/BB.Securities.Litigation. 2 .2 6.0l.html;
Compl. at 7, John Doe v. Yahoo!, Inc., (C.D. Cal. filed May, 2000) (No. CV-00-04993-NM
(CTx)).
4. Blake A. Bell, Plaintiff Corporations Face Resprisals from Cybersmear Defendants, 14 No.
8 CORP. COUNS. 1 (2000).
[Vol. 25:213
2001] Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP
Lawsuits commenced for the purpose of identifying and silencing
a cybersmear detractor are reminiscent of Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation (SLAPP).' SLAPP suits have long been recog-
nized as an abuse of the judicial system. Sixteen states have statutes or
strong case law prohibiting SLAPPs,6 and federal courts, while not di-
rectly appealing to SLAPP doctrine, have used a similar approach un-
der similar circumstances.7 However, most analyses of First Amend-
ment issues in cybersmear litigation have concentrated on the Free
Speech Clause and not the Petition Clause implicated by anti-SLAPP
law.8
This Comment questions the intellectual move away from
SLAPP analysis of cybersmear cases. Although the emphasis on free
speech has yielded some recent courtroom successes for online John
Does, the defendants in these cases have been able to appear in court
and assert their defenses.9 Where defendants cannot appear to chal-
5. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPP's: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 8-10 (1996) (stating that SLAPPs are suits filed as retaliation or reaction to defendant ac-
tion under the Petition Clause where the suit would most likely chill or stifle that protected ac-
tion).
6. California Anti-SLAPP Project, Other States: Statutes and Cases, available at http://
www.sirius.com/-casp/menstate.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2001) (anti-SLAPP laws pending in
many other states).
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that to avoid chilling
speech with frivolous lawsuits, standards of proof are higher in a libel action brought by a public
official than a regular citizen); Bill Johnson's Restaurants Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,
461 U.S. 731 (1983) (holding that a retaliatory lawsuit filed against an employee by an employer
is actionable as an unfair labor practice).
8. Commentators have summarily rejected analyzing cybersmear suits as SLAPPs on three
grounds: (1) because they "refer[] only to suits based on 'communications made to influence a
governmental action,"' Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860 n.l (2000) (citing PRING & CANAN, supra note 5); (2) be-
cause "this characterization ignores the power that the Internet gives irresponsible speakers to
damage the reputations of their targets," id. at 865; and (3) because it "underestimates the poten-
tial benefits that defamation law may bring to Internet discourse," id. It should also be noted,
however that the California Anti-SLAPP statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16, which this
Comment analyzes to some extent, explicitly implicates the Free Speech Clause of the Federal
and California State Constitutions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (a)-(b)(1).
Additionally, courts have recently ruled that § 425.16 may apply in some cybersmear con-
texts. Hollis-Eden v. Angelwatch, (No. GIC 759462) (San Diego County Ct. Mar. 20, 2001)
(Ruling on Defendants gpalcus and dickiel3_62301's Special Motion to Strike and Motion to
Quash Subpoena) (holding that posting on a Yahoo! message board about a publicly traded com-
pany is speech concerning a matter of public interest for the purposes of § 425.16); Global Tele-
media Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that anti-
SLAPP provisions apply to statements made on Raging Bull Message Boards (http://
www.ragingbull.com/community/) and that defendants making such statements are exercising
their free speech in connection with a public issue).
9. Jeffrey Benner, Chat Room Rants Protected, WIRED (Feb. 27, 2001), available at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,42039,00.html; Jeffrey Terraciano, Can John Doe Stay
Anonymous?, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/
0,1848,41714,00.html.
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lenge the sufficiency of the complaint on free speech grounds, SLAPP
analysis provides a procedural mechanism for stopping frivolous law-
suits before the defendant's identity may be sought regardless of
whether the defendant can appear. While it is true that the original
purposes of the anti-SLAPP movement were grounded in strict Peti-
tion Clause issues, where the initial communication was "made to in-
fluence governmental action or outcome,"'" current law and thinking
have broadened that criterion to include the greater scope of the Peti-
tion Clause as a protector of public speech." Under a broader defini-
tion, a First Amendment analysis of cybersmear must include not only
free speech but also SLAPP considerations.
Instead of proposing a courtroom strategy per se, this Comment
suggests that the SLAPP theory can function as a bar to abusive civil
discovery by increasing the plaintiffs burden before issuance of a sub-
poena against a Doe defendant. Given the importance of the role that
the Internet plays in facilitating communication and community
building as well as the value we place upon free and open discourse,
some regime of protection of anonymity must be instituted. In pri-
vately-controlled cyberspace, devoid of many of the constitutional
protections of real space, procedural or substantive changes must be
made in the law to protect subscriber privacy and preserve the partici-
patory, and ultimately democratic, nature of the Internet.
This Comment will first survey the law of cybersmear, illustrat-
ing the paradigmatic issues and legal theories employed. Then, it will
discuss the free speech issues and theoretical bases argued in court and
legal journals, paying special attention to the shortcomings in current
protection of defendant anonymity. Next, it will examine the value of
online anonymity and the protections that the SLAPP theory offers.
Finally, given the breakdown in the public and private space dichot-
omy, this Comment will argue for a new understanding of the SLAPP
constitutional protections in cyberspace. This understanding will rec-
ognize the powerful dynamics of online speech regulation, in contrast
with those of its real-world counterpart, and ensure that the would-be
private arbiters of the technology and, therefore, liberty in cyberspace
do not stifle the free discourse enabled by Internet technology.
10. PRING & CANAN, supra note 5, at 8.
11. For example, the California anti-SLAPP law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16, pro-
tects "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public fo-
rum in connection with an issue of public interest." 5 WITKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE (4th ed.
1997) Plead, § 962, at 422. In addition, Pring & Canan themselves indicate that their limitation
of the definition of SLAPP was to "provide a neutral, manageable, easily applied definition
whereby even opponents can agree on whether a case is a SLAPP or not," PRING & CANAN,
supra note 5, at 9, as opposed to being entirely true to the Petition Clause.
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II. CYBERSMEAR AND THE PIERCING OF ANONYMITY
A. The Cybersmear Phenomenon
In recent years, a vast industry of service and content providers
has taken shape in order to meet the demands of Internet users who
seek out, read, and post information for others to read on an infinite
number of topics. Among the most popular topics are the achieve-
ments and shortfalls of publicly traded companies. Various web sites,
Usenet newsgroups, and chatrooms are dedicated to the discussion of
stocks. In most of these fora, visitors with a wide range of expertise
post messages touting or criticizing the performance, management, or
employees of a given company. These messages are usually brief and
exaggerated, often consist entirely of hyperbole or sarcasm, and range.
in tone from insults and name-calling to sycophancy. They are usu-
ally posted pseudonymously by users whose pseudonyms bear no rela-
tion to their actual names. Most visitors to message boards know to
take anything they read with a grain of salt, as there is typically no way
to verify the identity of the poster nor the truth of the statement.
For example, Yahoo!, a web-based content provider, hosts typi-
cal message boards on their web site, http://messages.yahoo.com. 2
Posters sign up for pseudonyms that do not require them to divulge
any personally identifiable information (although their Internet Proto-
col addresses (IP addresses) 3 are tracked), and they can post messages
to any of Yahoo!'s message boards which include a topic on each pub-
licly-traded company. 4 Posters on Yahoo! message boards often make
outrageous claims about the information that they have or about their
position within a particular company. Most visitors are completely
aware of the unreliable nature of these posts, and Yahoo! itself has a
12. Yahoo!'s message board topics run the gamut from computers to politics to sex. Their
stock message boards, however, listed by industry category and company stock symbol at http://
messages.yahoo.com/yahoo/Business___Finance/Investments/Sectors/, are among the most
contentious. Other popular stock message boards include Raging Bull (http://www.ragingbull.
com), The Motley Fool (http://www.fool.com), and Silicon Investor (http://
www.siliconinvestor.com).
13. An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is the number assigned to a computer on the
Internet. The protocols running on Internet servers and routers use IP addresses to direct infor-
mation between computers. See WEBOPEDIA, IP address, at http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/I/IP_address.html (last modified Dec. 22, 1997); Chuck Semeria, Understanding IPAd-
dressing: Everything You Ever Wanted To Know, (Apr. 26, 1996) at http://www.3com.com/
solutions/en_US/ncs/501302.html.
14. Yahoo! Message Boards, available at http://messages.yahoo.com/reminder.html (last
visited Jul. 16, 2001).
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disclaimer which warns visitors to assume that no one is who they say
they are."5
Despite the growing understanding among the Internet commu-
nity that message boards are, at best, of questionable factual value,
companies that have been disparaged on Yahoo! message boards or
other fora have filed numerous defamation suits against the unknown
John Does who posted critical or insulting messages. 6 These cybers-
mear cases ostensibly seek to recover for reputational damage allegedly
caused by a message board post.'7 The primary purpose of many of
these suits is not to pursue a defamation cause of action, however, but
to reveal the identity of the poster and quiet criticism.18
This practice is becoming increasingly popular among corporate
plaintiffs, raising several troubling issues. The most significant issue
is the lack of privacy afforded to subscriber information by the courts.
Subscriber information that is knowingly revealed to an online service
provider 9 is not protected under the Fourth Amendment because
there is no expectation of privacy.2" Additionally, subscriber informa-
tion is typically not protected by civil procedure.2' Finally, subscriber
15. Id.
16. One report says that over 70 cybersmear suits were filed in 1999-2000 alone, although
the number is likely much higher. Carl S. Kaplan, Judge Says Online Critic Has No Right to Hide
(June 9, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/cyber/cyberlaw/
091aw.html.
17. Jay Eisenhofer & Sidney S. Liebesman, Caught by the Net: What to do if a message board
messes with your client, Bus. LAW TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 42; Mark C. Pomeroy, Cyberlibel
and Cybersmears, available at http://www.bricker.com/newsevents/articIes/1 3 1 .asp (Jan. 2000).
18. Howard Mintz, 'Cybersmear' Lawsuits Raise Privacy Concern (Nov. 28, 1999), available
at http://www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/indepth/docs/boardsl 12999.htm; see also, So-
bel, supra note 2.
19. This Comment uses the term "online service provider" broadly to refer to Internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs), web message board hosts, and any other host or content provider who
might maintain users' personally identifiable information.
20. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that a
defendant who enters into a subscription agreement with an ISP revealed all the information re-
lated to his IP address to a third party under the Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), analy-
sis; he therefore, "cannot now claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his sub-
scriber information."); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507-09 (W.D. Va. 1999)
("Where... dissemination of information to nongovernment entities is not prohibited [by
agreement], there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information." Id. at 509).
21. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, do not provide any guidance for
dealing with John Doe defendants, but have been generally interpreted permissively in favor of
plaintiffs. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (John Does not mentioned concerning instituting a suit),
45(b)(2)-(3) (again, not mentioned concerning subpoenas); Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56
F.3d 35 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that suit permitted where reasonable discovery would likely re-
veal identity of unnamed party); Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980) (permitting fic-
titious names until identity could be learned through discovery); but see Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-89 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that discovery cannot go
forward against a Doe defendant without some degree of specificity in complaint).
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information is not protected from civil discovery under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)22 because the Act only protects
against discovery by government agencies.
23
As the courts have failed to protect user privacy, so have the
policies of the corporations that control user information. Terms of
Service and Privacy Policies that users must agree to are usually vague
about the circumstances under which a company will disclose
information.24 While most online service providers try to assure users
that their information will be used for very limited purposes, nearly all
of them reserve the right to disclose personally identifiable
information for "legal process." 25 This clause allows the online service
provider to avoid liability for nearly any disclosure to an attorney.
Therefore, in practice, privacy assurances by web content providers
are illusory when it comes to civil discovery targeted at uncovering a
user's identity.
B. Courtroom Strategies and Legislation that Protect Online Privacy from
Civil Subpoenas
1. Groping for Online Privacy
Federal substantive law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), as well as the Constitution, provide privacy protections in
both online and "real-world" contexts. 26 As is often the case, the sud-
den appearance over the past few years of parties trying to litigate
these issues in the online context has clarified the protections provided
22. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510
et seq. (Supp. 1999)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(1)(C) (1994).
24. For example, Yahoo!'s privacy policy states that personally identifiable information
may be released to a third party "under special circumstances, such as to comply with subpoenas
or when your actions violate the Yahoo! Terms of Service." Yahoo! Privacy,
http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us/mb/details.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2001). Of course,
one action that violates Yahoo!'s Terms of Service is posting defamatory material. Yahoo! Terms
of Service, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited Jul. 16, 2001).
25. Yahoo! Privacy Policy, available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/privacy/ (last visited
Jul. 16, 2001); see also, e.g., AT&T Privacy Policy, available at http://www.att.com/privacy/
(last visited Jul. 16, 2001); Privacy Policies, available at http://www.earthlink.com/
about/policies/privacy.html (revised Mar. 7, 2000); The Motley Fool: Privacy Statement, avail-
able at http://www.fool.com/community/register/privacystatement.htm (last visited Jul. 16,
2001); Raging Bull, Inc has created this privacy statement in order to demonstrate our firm commit-
ment to privacy, available at http://www.ragingbull.com/privacy.html (last visited Jul. 16,
2001); SI: Privacy Policy, available at http://www.siliconinvestor.com/misc/privacy.gsp (last
visited Jul. 16, 2001).
26. The Federal Trade Commission and the ECPA are among the forces at work here, as
well as the notice requirements in federal procedure and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.
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to consumers online; simply put, "a right to privacy is not generally
recognized on the Internet., 27  This is so primarily because private
corporations, which are not subject to the constitutional restraints im-
posed on government, control almost all the infrastructure and tech-
nology that make up the Internet.
As a bellwether of American cyber-citizenship, one of the first
America Online (AOL) cases litigated under the ECPA, McVeigh v.
Cohen,28 illustrates the problem of corporate control of private infor-
mation. In McVeigh, a Navy officer used his AOL account to com-
municate on a personal matter.29 The recipient checked the officer's
AOL profile, which included the officer's marital status as "gay,"and
reported that information to naval authorities.3" The Navy contacted
AOL and, without telling AOL that it was a government agency or
obtaining a court order, confirmed the officer's name and sexual orien-
tation before discharging him for violating the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy for gays in the military.31
While the McVeigh court found that the Navy had violated the
ECPA, the plaintiff prevailed only because it was the government that
sought to violate his privacy.3 2 The Act explicitly excludes account
information revealed to private companies from protection. Everyday,
companies seek to invade consumers' privacy in much the same way as
the government in McVeigh, but, by virtue of the simple fact that
these companies are not government agencies, their attempts at dis-
covery and requests for user information are not curtailed by any sort
of accountability for consumers' privacy.
Besides the ECPA, other legal theories placing liability on com-
panies that uncover private information rarely succeed. Central to
many of the problems encountered by defendants is the fact that con-
stitutional protections and the laws designed to enforce them only ex-
tend to government actions. As scholars are starting to argue, how-
ever, the government is no longer the arbiter of power in the online
environment.33 Private companies control so much of the information
and means by which we live our online lives that government intru-
sions, with the exception of criminal investigations, are negligible con-
cerns for the average user compared to the day-to-day intrusions by
27. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1607, 1614
n.22 (1999) (citing MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1997)).
28. 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998).
29. Id. at 217.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 220.
33. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1633-34.
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private organizations.34 Concerns over corporate intrusions are mas-
sive, however, and remain unaddressed. This section will examine the
strategies of some of the recent and pending litigation in cybersmear
cases and the intrusions into consumer privacy that accompany those
cases. The primary areas of law are as follows: (1) Fourth Amend-
ment protections against unreasonable search and seizure; (2) proce-
dural concerns of notice and opportunity to quash subpoenas attempt-
ing to discover personally identifiable information; (3) the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act; and (4) industry self-regulation
through the use of terms of service contractual protections.
2. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution ensures "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 31 It also directs that war-
rants may only be issued with certain specificity.36 Fourth Amend-
ment protections apply to "criminal prosecutions and suits for penal-
ties and forfeitures under the revenue laws."37 In general application,
the right to privacy is asserted under the Amendment when the infor-
mation is held with a reasonable expectation of privacy, free from un-
reasonable government intrusion.38
There are two problems typically encountered by litigants at-
tempting to apply a Fourth Amendment defense to discovery of per-
sonally identifiable information in a civil case. First, courts have given
us pause to question whether information provided to online service
providers is private information in the eyes of the law.39 Second, the
34. A survey of the issues presented at the Center for Democracy and Technology's pri-
vacy page (http://www.cdt.org/privacy/) or the Electronic Privacy Information Center's Pri-
vacy.org (http://www.privacy.org) illustrates a concentration of privacy issues concerning the
practices of private companies, not the government.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. The Fourth Amendment concludes, "Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." Id.
37. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 174 (1911).
38. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
39. In earlier Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court found that there was no pri-
vacy interest in data collected through day to day use of technology. See Jerry Berman & Deirdre
Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 Nova L. Rev. 551, 557 n.12 (1999)
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that individuals have no pri-
vacy interest in telephone numbers dialed from their homes); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442-43 (1976) (holding that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in finan-
cial records maintained by their banks)). Authors have been critical of the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment with regard to privately held personally identifiable in-
formation:
2001]
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Fourth Amendment is simply not applicable to civil suits because it
proscribes actions of the government rather than those of private par-
ties.
The Supreme Court provided the test for Fourth Amendment
analysis in Katz v. United States.g° In Katz, the Court held that
Fourth Amendment protection could be sought only when "the per-
son who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the invaded space. ,41 This rule was clarified in
California v. Greenwood,42 where the Court held that the individual
seeking protection must manifest an objectively reasonable, subjective
expectation of privacy.43 The rule, as clarified, was applied in a crimi-
nal case to subscriber information held by an ISP in United States v.
Hambrick." The Hambrick court held that two conditions must be
met before attempting to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy:
"(1) the data must not be knowingly exposed to others, and (2) the
Internet service provider's ability to access the data must not consti-
tute a disclosure."s The court found that information collected by the
ISP when a subscriber signs up for service is knowingly revealed to the
ISP.46 Information so revealed cannot be held with a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, therefore, is not protectable as private
information under the Fourth Amendment. 7
Even if a civil defendant was able to demonstrate that the infor-
mation was unknowingly revealed to the online service provider, an
attempt to assert Fourth Amendment protections against search and
seizure would still fail because the Amendment only protects citizens
against invasions of privacy by the government. 48  Therefore, since
The Court's application of this standard has proved particularly troublesome in the
information privacy context. The Court has continually held that individuals have no
privacy interest in information divulged to the private sector, even though modem so-
ciety leaves citizens no option but to disclose to others, e.g., disclosure as a condition
of participation in society and technology accumulating transactional data.
Berman & Mulligan, supra.
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 353.
42. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
43. Id. at 39-43.
44. 55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999).
45. Id. at 507.
46. Id. at 508-09.
47. Id.
48. See Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that for a Fourth
Amendment violation, the right of privacy must be breached by a state actor; a private attorney
acting under color of a court-authorized subpoena is not a state actor). Cf. Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091-92 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that a court
ordered subpoena, on the other hand, "even when issued at the request of a private party in a civil
[Vol. 25:213
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constitutional privacy protections are not extended to Doe defendants
in cybersmear cases, they have pursued other avenues.
3. Rules and Case Law of Civil Procedure
Plaintiffs in cybersmear cases must often bend the rules of civil
procedure in order to proceed with discovery against a John Doe de-
fendant. In the federal courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and
45 have notice requirements where notice must be given to the oppos-
ing party upon filing a lawsuit49 or upon serving a court-ordered sub-
poena." When the defendant is a John Doe, however, the plaintiff of-
ten cannot readily identify him or her, so the plaintiff and the court
must skirt the notice requirements to proceed with the case.
Rule 4 requires that a civil plaintiff serve a defendant with a
summons and a copy of the complaint within 120 days of filing law-
suit."' Federal courts have permitted a wide variety of service meth-
ods, including those of the local state, but service of process must al-
ways be reasonably calculated to effectuate actual service.12 Courts
have consistently dismissed cases where the plaintiff did not attempt
to serve process in good faith, or failed to serve process without taking
any and all reasonable steps to do so. However, where the identity of
the defendant is unknown (as in cybersmear cases), courts often allow
limited discovery to find out who it is. 3
Although frowned upon in some circuits, and not provided for in
the FRCP, courts generally allow suits filed under fictitious names
("John Doe") when it appears that reasonable pre-trial discovery will
uncover the defendant's true identity. 4 The only limitations on this
discovery device in federal court are the particular judge's disposition
towards fictitiously-named parties and the concern that, when federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the un-
named parties would destroy diversity. 5
lawsuit, constitutes state action and as such is subject to constitutional limitations.") (citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
50. FED. R. CIv. P. 45(b).
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1)-(2), (m).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1).
53. See David M. Epstein, Annotation, Propriety of Use of Fictitious Name of Defendant in
Federal District Court, 139 A.L.R. FED. 553 (1999); John Schwartz, Questions on Net Anonymity
(Oct. 17, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/17/technology/17ONLI.html.
54. The Ninth Circuit is especially unfond of fictitious names. See, e.g., Molnar v. Na-
tional Broad. Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that the practice of suing under
fictitious names is not justified by the FRCP); Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 615 (9th
Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Molnar).
55. See generally, Epstein, supra note 53.
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The Supreme Court has long allowed fictitious names in com-
plaints without changing the circumstances of the action. In Pullman
Co. v. Jenkins, 6 the fact that not all defendants were specifically
named in the action did not justify ignoring those defendants for di-
versity purposes. Not only did the Court allow the fictitiously-named
defendant to remain a party, it denied the petitioner's attempt to re-
move the case on the basis of diversity without proving the unidenti-
fied defendant's diverse citizenship.
5 7
This rule has been followed well beyond diversity issues. Dis-
covery has also been permitted without previously finding the actual
names of the parties in order to determine their identity. In Estate of
Rosenberg v. Crandell,"8 the Eighth Circuit held that "an action may
proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint
makes allegations specific enough to be ascertained after reasonable
discovery." 9  Likewise, in Maclin v. Paulson,6" the Seventh Circuit
held that "the use of fictitious names for defendants has been routinely
approved even without discussion... when, as here, a party is igno-
rant of defendants' true identity, it is unnecessary to name them until
their identity can be learned through discovery or aid of the trial
court."6
The plaintiffs in both Rosenberg and Maclin pled the facts suffi-
cient to indicate that if the defendants were identified, the plaintiffs
would have an actionable claim.62 In Maclin, for instance, the plaintiff
alleged that two unnamed police officers beat him, denied him the
right to call an attorney, and unnecessarily delayed his trial.63 The
plaintiff provided the exact date of the alleged beating, indicated that
the officers in question were the arresting officers, and gave the exact
location of the alleged beating.64
State courts have been much more permissive in recent and
pending cybersmear cases, allowing discovery with much less particu-
larity in the complaint. In Hvide v. Doe,6" the court allowed discovery
even though the complaint did not identify all the screen names of the
56. 305 U.S. 534 (1939).
57. Id. at 540.
58. 56 F.3d 35 (8th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 37.
60. 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 87 n.4 (citing a wealth of case law to that effect).
62. Rosenberg, 56 F.3d at 36; Maclin, 627 F.2d at 86-87.
63. Maclin, 627 F.2d at 86-87.
64. Id. at 84.
65. No. 99-22831-CA01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. amended complaint filed Feb. 17, 2000) (cur-
rently on appeal).
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Does nor the allegedly defamatory postings.66 Likewise, in Xircom v.
Doe67 and Raytheon v. Doe,68 the trial courts permitted discovery to
identify the people behind screen names who had posted allegedly de-
famatory messages."
Implicit in the courts' ruling in favor of reasonable, limited dis-
covery of the identity of a party is the notion that it is not necessary to
give notice of commanded production to the unnamed parties." Else-
where in the online context, however, some courts have approached
unopposed discovery with more caution. In the sua sponte decision of
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 71 the court found that under
the Ninth Circuit rule disfavoring unnamed parties, limiting the plain-
tiffs discovery against an unknown and unserved defendant is neces-
sary in the interest of "foster[ing] open communication and robust de-
bate.... People who have committed no wrong should be able to
participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or
embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power
of the court's order to discover their identity."72 The court further
held that in order to balance the need of injured parties to have their
day in court against the "legitimate and valuable right to participate in
online forums anonymously or pseudonymously,"73 the plaintiff must
(1) show that the defendant is an individual or entity that could be
sued, (2) show all efforts they have made to serve process on defen-
dant, and (3) satisfy the court that the complaint could withstand a
66. Id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU and ACLU of Florida at 4, 12 n.9, Hvide v.
Doe; Kaplan, Judge Says Online Critic Has No Right to Hide, supra note 16.
67. No. Civ. 188724 (Calif. Super. Ct. Ventura County June 14, 1999).
68. No. 99-816 (Mass. Super. Ct. Middlesex County filed Feb. 1, 1999). Xircom was set-
tled before an appeal of the subpoena was heard, Raytheon was withdrawn by the plaintiff after
discovering the identities of the posting authors through subpoena.
69. Rebecca Fairely Raney, Judge Rejects Online Critic's Efforts to Remain Anonymous (June
15, 1999), available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/O6/cyber/articles/15identity.
html.
70. In addition to the initial notice and service requirements in the Federal Rules, notice to
the opposing party is required when serving a court-mandated subpoena on a third party. The
problem presented by plaintiffs' inability to serve process on Doe defendants is compounded by
the intent of the compelled subpoena notice requirement. FRCP 45 states, "Prior notice of any
commanded production of documents... before trial shall be served on each party." FED. R.
CIV. P. 45(b)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes for this rule further provide that "[t]he pur-
pose of such notice is to afford the other parties an opportunity to object to the production or
inspection." FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee's note, 1991 Amendment, Subdivision (b).
The notice requirement of Rule 45 cannot be fulfilled when the other parties are not known.
The result is that Doe defendants are denied their opportunity to object to a court-ordered sub-
poena that seeks to discover their identity from an online service provider.
71. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
72. Id. at 578.
73. Id.
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motion to dismiss.74 Finally, after meeting these criteria, the plaintiff
should file an appropriate request for discovery outlining its satisfac-
tion of the three requirements and aimed at making actual service of
process upon the defendant possible. 7 In Seescandy.com, a singular
email address, a variety of aliases, and email correspondence were suf-
ficient to show that the defendant was an individual who could be
sued.76 Also, a record of phone calls made to all available numbers,
letters sent to all available addresses, and emails sent to all available
email addresses were sufficient to satisfy the second element of show-
ing all previous efforts.77 Finally, the court stressed the importance of
the requirement that the plaintiff make a showing that its claim could
survive a motion to dismiss:
A conclusory pleading will never be sufficient to satisfy this ele-
ment. Pre-service discovery is akin to the process used in
criminal investigations to obtain warrants. The requirement
that the government show probable cause is, in part, a protection
against the misuse of ex parte procedures to invade the privacy
of one who has done no- wrong. A similar requirement is neces-
sary here to prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of
the discovery process....78
Since the plaintiff in that case was suing for control of a domain
name, its claims, including trademark dilution and false designation of
origin, were well-supported by the allegations in the complaint, and
the court ordered them to file discovery requests to determine the ac-
tual identity of the defendant.79
Seescandy.com brings two important concepts to the debate of
pre-trial discovery against unnamed Doe defendants. First, the court
justifies its four-part analysis by acknowledging that it must balance
the needs of the allegedly injured party against the rights of the online
anonymous speaker regardless of whether the latter has made an ap-
74. Id. at 578-80.
75. Id. at 580.
Lastly, the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the Court, along with a
statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested as well as identifica-
tion of a limited number of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be
served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will
lead to identifying information about defendant that would make service of process
possible.
Id.
76. Id. at 579.
77. Id. (Seescandy.com is a domain name dispute, and the plaintiffs gleaned all of their con-
tact information for the defendant from that provided in his domain registration with Network
Solutions, Inc. (http://www.networksolutions.com)).
78. Id. at 579-80.
79. For the plaintiff's claims see id. at 575, the holding is at 580-81.
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pearance.8s Second, in applying the four-part analysis, the court limits
the ability of the plaintiff to go on a fishing expedition by requiring a
civil version of showing just cause before permitting discovery."' The
recognition that the Internet, particularly in the context of discovery
against Doe defendants, requires heightened procedural safeguards, is
critical to just adjudication of online issues. The shift from physical to
virtual reality has resulted in a shift in the power balance from gov-
ernment to private entities. The entity that controls the "space"
makes the laws for the space, and cyberspace is almost entirely in the
hands of the private industry.
In a flip-flop of the citizen/government power dynamic, the
holding in Seescandy.com was followed by another district court in
Stewart v. F.B.I.," in which a citizen sued the federal law enforcement
agency for violations of the Privacy Act 3 and under common law. In
Stewart, the plaintiff named as defendants four John Does, who were
allegedly informing the FBI of the plaintiff's activities. The court util-
ized the Seescandy.com test to determine if the case against the Does
could proceed. The court found that the plaintiff failed to show (1)
that the court would have jurisdiction over the Does, (2) that he had
taken reasonable steps to ascertain identity, and (3) that he intended to
discover the identity of actual individual. 4 Having failed the three
"limiting principles" of the Seesdcandy.com criteria, the case against
the Does was dismissed.ss
At least one state court has adopted the Seescandy.com test for
discovery against online John Does specifically in the context of cy-
bersmear. In Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 6 the first major cy-
bersmear case on appeal, the appellate court analyzed the trial court's
use of the Seescandy.com test and found that it was appropriate even
though it resulted in more stringent requirements for plaintiff to prove
a prima facie case than against a motion to dismiss.8
80. Id. at 578.
81. Id. at 579-80.
82. No. CV-97-1595-ST, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18784 (D. Or. 1999), order adopted at
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18785 (D. Or. 1999).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
84. Stewart, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18784 at *6-12. The court made sure to note that the
individual being subjected to discovery could not be an excluded party under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Id.
8 5. Id. at *6-7.
86. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
87. Id. at 769-70.
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In Dendrite, a poster with the screen name "xxplrr" posted three
comments on Yahoo!'s Dendrite message board88 theorizing that the
company's president had altered its revenue recognition accounting
procedures and deceptively structured contract income in order to
please investors with escalating revenue.89 A fourth message sug-
gested that the president was unsuccessfully trying to sell the com-
pany. 9° On the basis of these messages, Dendrite sued xxplrr as John
Doe No. 3 alleging defamation and misappropriation of trade secrets.91
Dendrite then sought discovery to ascertain John Doe No. 3's
identity.92 The trial court denied discovery against John Doe No. 3,
stating:
The Court has found that the principals [sic] outlined in the
Seescandy.com case are applicable to the instant matter and pro-
vide the parameters to be used in this balancing of interests.
Dendrite has not made a prima facie case of defamation against
John Doe No. 3, as Dendrite has failed to demonstrate the falsity
of each of the alleged defamatory statements and/or Dendrite
has failed to demonstrate the that it was harmed by any of the
posted messages.
Though Dendrite pled the prima facie case sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss, 94 it did not plead facts sufficient to grant discovery
when the defendant's anonymity is at stake.95 Reviewing this seminal
application of the Seescandy.com test to a cybersmear case, the appel-
late court stated, "application of our motion-to-dismiss standard in
isolation fails to provide a basis for disclosure in light of [the defen-
dant]'s competing right of anonymity in the exercise of his right of free
speech." 96
88. Yahoo! DRTE, linked from http://messages.yahoo.com/yahoo/Business-Finance/
Investments/Sectors/Technology/Software andProgramming/indexl.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2001).
89. Dendrite Int., 775 A.2d at 763.
90. Id.
91. Id. Dendrite sued a total of 14 John Does with allegations of breach of contract, defa-
mation, and misappropriated trade secrets. Id. However, the appeal focused entirely on xxplrr,
John Doe No. 3. Id. at 760.
92. Id. at 764.
93. Dendrite Int. v. John Does, No. MRS C-129-00, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 23,
2000) (opinion on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause), available at http://www.citizen.
org/litigation/briefs/dendrite.pdf.
94. Citing Zoneraich v. Overlook Hospital, 514 A.2d 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986),
the court stated that a defamation complaint must include the alleged defamatory words (identi-
fied by Dendrite as xxpirr's specific postings), their utterer (xxplrr him- or herself), and the fact
of their publication (they were on Yahoo!'s message board). Dendrite Int., 775 A.2d at 770.
95. Id. at 769-70.
96. Id. at 770; Dendrite Int., No. MRS C-129-00, at 22 (finding insufficient evidence "that
would warrant this Court to revoke [defendant's] constitutional protections").
[Vol. 25:213228
Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA recognizes the need for enhanced privacy protections
in the online environment. In order for electronic communications or
subscriber information to be disclosed to a government entity under
the Act, the entity seeking disclosure must obtain a court order or
similar warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.97
That order will be issued only if "the governmental entity offers spe-
cific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.""8 This requirement of some showing
of fact is similar to the requirements articulated by the court in Sees-
candy. com. More similar is the operative result that abuse of the abil-
ity to obtain disclosure is cut short by not allowing it without some
demonstrable relation to an actual, litigable or prosecutable issue.
While the ECPA does limit private parties' disclosure of elec-
tronic communications, such limitation does not extend to restrict dis-
closure of subscriber information to private parties: "a provider of
electronic communications service or remote computing service may
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or to a
customer of such a service ... to any person other than a government
entity."99 In Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc. ,'0 the plaintiffs
attempt to show that AOL was liable under the civil penalty provision
of the ECPA1' failed because the party to which AOL had disclosed
the plaintiffs subscriber information was not a government entity. 10 2
Although Jessup-Morgan is not an example of abusive discovery,
it demonstrates that the absence of any additional protections under
the ECPA leaves open the possibility of abuse and does not provide
for notice when subscriber information is requested. In AnswerThink
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Doe, °3 the plaintiff filed a cybersmear defa-
mation complaint against twelve unnamed Yahoo! message board
posters. The plaintiff served subpoenas on Yahoo! and was given per-
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (b) (1994).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (d) (1994).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(1)(A) (1994).
100. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994).
102. Jessup-Morgan, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 ("AOL made the disclosure, not to the public,
but to a private individual, [an] attorney, pursuant to a properly executed subpoena."). The re-
cord does not indicate that the attorney served a court-ordered subpoena; rather, this subpoena
was most likely served by the attorney as an officer of the court pursuant to FRCP 45(a)(3). Id.
103. No. CV 00-03407-NM (CTx) (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 23, 2000).
2001]
Seattle University Law Review
sonally identifiable information for the screen name Aquacool_2000.04
It then filed a second suit to include Aquacool_2000's alleged actual
name.' In the first lawsuit of its kind, Aquacool_2000 filed suit
against Yahoo! for disclosing his subscriber information under circum-
stances that were inappropriate, despite being permissible under the
ECPA. °6  In his complaint, Aquacool_2000 alleged, among other
things, that Yahoo! acted improperly in (1) failing to make any efforts
to give him notice of the disclosure of his personal information, 17 (2)
accepting sub-standard service of subpoenas (by fax), and in (3) failing
to make any efforts to confirm that the subpoenas were filed as part of
a valid lawsuit when Yahoo! knew or should have known that many of
the subpoenas it receives are issued under false pretenses or in contra-
vention of state or federal law."' Ultimately, Aquacool_2000 argued
that Yahoo! infringed on his free speech rights:
Members who are the subject of frivolous defamation lawsuits
and who later learn that Yahoo! has disclosed their information
to third parties in response to subpoenas have their free-speech
rights and rights anonymous speech unjustifiably chilled, to the
detriment of the public at large by the dampening of the public
debate caused thereby. 19
To the extent that the ECPA does not prohibit the disclosure of
subscriber information to a civil plaintiff, the adverse effect on speech
that the Act was designed to protect remains. "' If the privacy inva-
sions that chill open expression on the Internet are to be avoided,
additional rules must be put in place to prevent abuses not only by the
government, but by private industry as well.
5. Contract-Terms of Service and Privacy Policies
All major online service providers have contractual terms that the
user must agree to before using the service. Usually consisting of a
Terms of Service (TOS) and a Privacy Policy, these contracts afford
104. Compl. at 8, John Doe v. Yahoo!, No. CV-00-04993-NM (CTx) (C.D. Cal. filed
May, 2000).
105. Carl S. Kaplan, In Fight Over Anonymity, John Doe Starts Slugging (June 2, 2000),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/cyber/cyberlaw/O2law.html.
106. John Doe v. Yahoo! Inc., No. CV-00-04993-NM (CTx) (C.D. Cal. filed May, 2000).
107. Yahoo!, as of May 26, 2000, claims to provide prior notice of disclosure. See Brian
Livingston, Policy change at Yahoo causes "identity crisis" (May 26, 2000), available at http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1278-210-3287287-1 .html.
108. Compl. at 6, Doe v. Yahoo!, No. CV-00-04993-NM (CTx) (including the allegations
of (1) Invasion of Privacy, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Negligent Misrepresentation, and (4) Un-
fair Competition and False Advertising).
109. Id. at 7.
110. See 132 CONG. REC. 14,441 (1986).
[Vol. 25:213
Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP
little protection to users when a third party subpoenas subscriber in-
formation."' A brief survey of TOS and Privacy Policies of industry
leading online service providers reveals that all provide exceptions to
privacy protection for "legal process" or other circumstances with
varying degrees of vagueness. 112 The following excerpt from Yahoo!'s
Privacy Policy is typical:
Yahoo! may also disclose account information in special cases
when we have reason to believe that disclosing this information
is necessary to identify, contact or bring legal action against
someone who may be violating Yahoo!'s Terms of Service or
may be causing injury to or interference with (either intention-
ally or unintentionally) Yahoo!'s rights or property, other Ya-
hoo! users, or anyone else that could be harmed by such activi-
ties. Yahoo! may disclose or access account information when
we believe in good faith that the law requires it .... 113
Policies such as Yahoo!'s provide no privacy protection whatso-
ever to users whose identities are sought in connection with a civil law-
suit. In addition, a brief examination of major financial message board
hosts shows that only one online service provider's privacy policy sur-
veyed included any provision for notice to be sent to a user before his
or her personally identifiable information is disclosed.114 Prior notice
gives John Doe defendants an opportunity to challenge the subpoena
of their personal information.
While online service providers might, in practice, provide more
privacy protection than indicated in their privacy policies, the actual
protection afforded to all users is minimal because there is typically no
contract provision allocating further liability for privacy to the online
service provider."1 Yahoo!, for example, does not necessarily hold it-
self out as providing notice when subscriber records are requested,
though they have publicized that their usual practice (now) is to do
so.116 Without an explicit notice provision, however, the user has no
recourse against Yahoo! if the latter discloses subscriber information
111. Supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. Yahoo! Privacy Policy, available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/privacy/ (last visited
Jul. 16, 2001).
114. That one host was stock message board site for Go2Net (now InfoSpace, Inc.), Silicon
Investor, [ Go2Net® ], available at http://www.go2net.com/corporate/legal/ (last visited Jul.
16, 2001). The current disclosure section of the Silicon Investor privacy policy mirrors the text
of the Go2Net policy, SI: Privacy Policy, available at http://www.siliconinvestor.com/
misc/privacy.gsp (last visited Jul. 16, 2001).
115. See Livingston, supra note 107; Kaplan, Judge Says Online Critic Has No Right to Hide,
supra note 16 (indicating that Yahoo!, AOL, and MSN provide notice).
116. See Livingston, supra note 107.
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without notice. Further, the company has little legal incentive to be
vigilant about its disclosures.
In Doe v. Yahoo!, the plaintiff sued Yahoo! for, inter alia, breach
of contract, alleging that the company improperly disclosed the plain-
tiffs subscriber information in violation of its own privacy policy, as
quoted above.117 The plaintiff argued (1) that Yahoo!'s disclosure was
not required by law, so Yahoo! was not acting in good faith when it
gave disclosure; (2) that, even if Yahoo! was acting in good faith, the
resulting deprivation of privacy rights and due process opportunity
was in contravention of public policy; (3) that Yahoo! violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in contract by disclos-
ing personal information to a hostile party; and (4) that the TOS and
Privacy Policies were contracts of adhesion and unenforceable as waiv-
ers of plaintiffs remedies. " ' In addition, the plaintiff alleged negli-
gent misrepresentation, claiming that Yahoo! lulls its members into a
false sense of security that their information is protected while rou-
tinely disclosing subscriber information.
1 9
Although no ruling was issued on these allegations, commenta-
tors have agreed that subscribers who agree to TOS and Privacy Poli-
cies like Yahoo!'s do not have the privacy protections that they believe
to enjoy. Part of the problem is the alien online landscape-
individuals hold "privacy expectations" about the vulnerability of
their conduct which are native to real space yet inapplicable to cyber-
space."' Most people do not realize that privacy intrusions that would
be unthinkable in the home are easily accomplished by many entities
online. Another part of the problem is that users are desensitized to
the loss of their privacy rights through consent in facing a constant
stream of disclaimers and consent checkboxes that they must agree to
in order to carry on life online.
121
While online service providers might defeat the protections rep-
resented in their own Privacy Policies, they also fail to disclose their
actual practices. Many providers apparently do make an effort to give
advance notice to subscribers before disclosing the latter's informa-
117. See also Yahoo! Terms of Service 6.a., available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/
terms/ (last visited Jul. 16, 2001) (propagating defamatory content is prohibited by Terms of
Service).
118. Compl. at 11, John Doe v. Yahoo!, No. CV-00-04993-NM (CTx) (C.D. Cal. 2000).
119. Id. at 12.
120. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 39, at 556-68. The authors note that "storing...
personal thoughts and reflections on a remote server eliminates many of the privacy protections
they were afforded when they were under the bed .. " Id. at 567.
121. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1675-76 (arguing that one of the benefits of
adopting default privacy rules and only seeking consent when a data-collector tries to go beyond
those rules is that users would lend the consent more scrutiny).
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tion, but almost all of the providers fail to give assurances of notice in
their TOS and Privacy Policy.122 This absence leaves subscribers with
no enforceable right to notice, and service providers with free reign to
forgo notice when convenient.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSES OF CYBERSMEAR
A. Freedom of Speech
Nearly all commentators on First Amendment issues in cybers-
mear have concentrated on the free speech implications of these
unique libel cases. 123  Defamation defenses on free speech grounds
generally follow two theories: the opinion privilege and the public fig-
ure doctrine.Y14 While the public figure doctrine has been applied to
cyber and real space speech alike since the seminal case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,121 the use of the doctrine in cybersmear has been
criticized as not responsive to the unique abilities of the defendants in
these cases to be heard and their relative recklessness vis-A-vis other
media. 126  The opinion privilege, on the other hand, has not been so
criticized thus far, although it too fails to preserve anonymity of the
defendant.
27
1. Public Figure Doctrine
The public figure doctrine extends from the New York Times case
and its progeny.2 8 The central principle in the public figure doctrine
is that, in the interest of robust debate, the standard of proof should be
higher for a "public figure" defamation plaintiff, who has "project[ed]
himself into the arena of public controversy and into the very 'vortex
of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern.'"12 Thus,
122. In April of 2000, Yahoo! adopted a policy of notifying users when it receives a sub-
poena about them. Kaplan, John Doe Starts Slugging, supra note 105. However, this policy
change was never reflected in their published privacy policy at http://privacy.yahoo.
com/privacy/us/.
123. See, e.g., Jeremy Stone Weber, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel
Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. 235
(1995).
124. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 8.
125. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
126. See Lidsky, supra note 8, at 917-19.
127. Lidsky, supra note 8. Professor Lidsky's article is notable for its suggestion that the
opinion privilege is sufficient to protect online anonymous speech as well as its rejection of
SLAPP as a viable theory to defend John Does against cybersmear claims.
128. W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V.
SULLIVAN 1-8 (1989); LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 52 (1978).
129. ELDREDGE, supra note 128, § 52, at 275 (citing Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing
Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966)).
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public figure defamation plaintiffs are required to show actual malice;
they must show that the defendant either knew his statement was false
or recklessly disregarded whether it was false or not at the time it was
published. The extent of the rule today is a result of Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, in which the Court held that a public figure need not be a
public official but must have sufficient public notoriety to launch a
counterargument."3 ° In that case, the Court stated that a plaintiff
could be as minimally public as a college football coach to be held to
the actual malice standard. 3'
The problems with the use of the public figure doctrine as a solu-
tion for cybersmear are twofold. First, and most significantly, if the
doctrine can be applied as a defense to be asserted in court, it does
nothing to protect the defendants' anonymity.' 32 Since abusive cy-
bersmear cases are withdrawn following discovery, the defendant
133never even appears in court.
2. The Opinion Privilege Online: An Empty Ideal
The opinion privilege holds somewhat more promise as a free
speech solution to abusive cybersmear; however, the general disarray
130. 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967).
131. Id.
132. Defendants who do not receive notice of the suit filed against them are unlikely to ap-
pear in court in their own defense. As plaintiffs ostensibly try to comply with civil notice re-
quirements, discovery may proceed against Does "for purposes of service of process" and defen-
dants' anonymity is compromised.
133. See, e.g., Terraciano, supra note 9.
In cyberspace, commentators have suggested that the public figure doctrine should apply to any-
one who engages in online debate. Mike Godwin writes, "If online conferencing means any-
thing, it means fostering of outspokenness--in effect, every opinionated individual has a micro-
phone and an audience.... It's almost trivially easy to become a public figure on the Net."
MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 82 (1998).
Further, many have pointed out that the relative ease of rebutting potentially defamatory state-
ments online gives all netizens the public access firepower of a public figure. See, e.g., GODWIN,
supra, at 82 ("If some bozo writes one hundred lines of false statement and innuendo about your
sex life and personal habits, you can write five hundred lines of point-by-point refutation."
Godwin writes that his views lead to the conclusion that there would be no libel suits online:
people would just hit the reply button instead. Id. He contrasts this conclusion with the way li-
bel law did develop on the Internet, much to the consternation of civil libertarians. Id.); see also
Weber, supra note 123, at 261 ("A libel plaintiff who can post counterspeech on the bulletin
board where the defamatory statement appeared is thereby analogous to a public official or fig-
ure. Thus the actual malice standard should be constitutionally required for that plaintiff to re-
cover damages.") (citing EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE
LAW 80 (1994)). However, as a legal theory in general, authors have questioned whether an as-
sumed public figure status recognizes the reality of power inequities that permeate from the real
world. While any defamation victim might be able to post a reply, the extent to which that reply
is effective in rectifying the harm, if any, of the original statement still depends on the "ability
and willingness" of others to concern themselves with the reply. Michael Hadley, The Gertz
Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 492 (1998).
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of the opinion privilege makes reliance tenuous. Prior to Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.,134 courts had constructed a fact/opinion dichotomy
in defamation law that considered the context of a statement before as-
signing liability. 3 This dichotomy was rooted in the Supreme
Court's infamous dicta from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that "[u]nder
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."' 36 Milk-
ovich virtually obliterated the application of this dicta in the courts.
While not completely destroying the fact/opinion dichotomy in
defamation law, the Supreme Court in Milkovich narrowed the defini-
tion of 'opinion' to near absurdity.'37
[T]he court declared that the statement "In my opinion Jones is
a liar" can be just as damaging to the reputation of Jones as the
statement "Jones is a liar." The first statement may imply a
false assertion of fact because it invites the audience to assume
that unstated defamatory facts undergird the author's asser-
tion.
38
The analysis of liability therefore shifted from extrinsic factors
that might show that a statement was intended as that of fact or opin-
ion to a somewhat protectionist stance towards the plaintiff. Under
the Milkovich rule, the possible perception of defamatory meaning by
a third party, rather than the intent of the defendant, is the issue. As a
134. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
135. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 8, at 922 (describing the influential four-factor approach
of then D.C. Circuit Judge Starr: "(1) 'the common usage or meaning of the specific language of
the challenged statements itself; (2) 'the statement's verifiability'; (3) the linguistic context of the
statement; and (4) 'the broader social context or setting in which the statement appears."') (citing
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)) (footnotes omitted).
136. 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). The quote concludes, at 339-40: "However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."
137. See, e.g., MARK SABLEMAN, MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS: COMMUNICATIONS LAW
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 83 (1997).
When the Milkovich case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court laid down a
new federal constitutional rule concerning liability for opinions: The more outrageous
your opinions, in style and content, the more likely they are to be protected. This is
an oversimplification, but not by much. The Court's ruling in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co. divided up the universe of opinion, a field that had been afforded nearly
complete protection from libel laws. Commentary that uses concrete words and facts
and understated expression-the kind that really makes you think-after Milkovich,
can, for the most part, subject the speaker to a full-fledged multimillion-dollar libel
suit. But overstated and grossly exaggerated rhetoric--even when it uses highly
charged words like 'blackmail,' 'treason,' and 'rape'-remains fully protected.
Id.
138. Lidsky, supra note 8, at 924 (footnotes omitted).
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result, only those statements that "cannot be interpreted as stating ac-
tual facts" are protectable under the First Amendment.139
In the absence of any contextual analysis of cybersmear state-
ments, anonymous online authors on message boards strewn with
high-strung hyperbole rarely have a chance to succeed with an opinion
defense. 4 ° Simply put, given the tone of these boards, nearly any ex-
pression could be found actionable. Additionally, like the problem
with the public figure doctrine, the opinion privilege must be asserted
by the defendant in court. This requires the identity of John Doe to
be revealed for notice purposes, destroying anonymity and obviating
the goal of not chilling speech.'
B. Theoretical Underpinnings Supporting a Free Speech Analysis and
Justifying Limitations on Defamation Defenses
It is not enough to know that online John Does are not afforded
protection as a matter of course. An exploration of why reveals that
free speech theory, as applied to defamation on the Internet, fails to
recognize the unique nature of the medium in eliciting and maintain-
ing dialogue and community. This section will venture onto this un-
certain ground and illustrate the social and policy issues concerning
First Amendment protections in cybersmear cases. Initially looking at
139. Id. at 928. On 929, she continues: "The Court's failure to specify what role context
plays in determining whether a statement implies an assertion of objective fact is a critical flaw in
its analysis." Indeed, the Court does not specify the role of context because it has no place in
their strict analysis of the text of the allegedly defamatory statement.
140. Nat Stern has argued that Milkovich did little but clarify the opinion privilege in
defamation, leaving the fact/opinion doctrine substantially intact. But even under his analysis,
context of the statement at question can be ignored: "Once meaning is established, the resolution
of opinion-cum-nonverifiability virtually always becomes self evident." Nat Stern, Defamation,
Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REV.
595, 615 (1990). Thus, he says, "verifiability often becomes intertwined with linguistic analy-
sis." Id. However, even he admits that the overly formalist tendencies of this approach have
their draw-backs: "Unduly facile judicial reliance on verifiability may vitiate proper analysis; or
ostensibly verifiable statement [sic] may be classified as factual when a more intricate inquiry
into context would disclose a less literal content." Stem, supra, at 615 n.147. Stern would be
hard-pressed to show a similar disposition in the Malkovich majority. In fact, Justice Brennan
dissents from the majority on the very issue of looking at the context of allegedly defamatory
statements: "I part company with the Court ... because I find that challenged statements cannot
reasonably be interpreted as either stating or implying defamatory facts about petitioner." Malk-
ovich, 471 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
141. However, the opinion privilege does have the virtue of being raiseable as early as a
motion to dismiss. See Lidsky, supra note 8, at 921. But see Sobel, supra note 2, at 3
("[A]nonymity also plays an important role in fostering free expression. The protections of ano-
nymity thus takes on added significance on the Internet .. "); Lisa M. Nijm, The Online Mes-
sage Board Controversy: Physicians Hit with Claims of Libel and Insider Trading by Their Employ-
ers, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 223, 238 (2000) ("If the current trend of 'John Doe' cases continues, then
the result will be a chilling effect on anonymous speech on the Internet.").
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the justifications for defamation law, then continuing to the qualified
privileges and their application online, this section will show the in-
adequacies of relying on free speech defenses both theoretically and
pragmatically. The ultimate consequence of these inadequacies is that
the beneficial aspects of the Internet as an open forum are jeopardized
because of the chilling effect on speech brought on by lesser protec-
tions created for the print and broadcast media.
As noted above, commentators have analyzed the First Amend-
ment issues of cybersmear almost exclusively in terms of the Free
Speech Clause. The first substantive works touted the historic preser-
vation of free speech freedoms in civil defamation as a baseline for
limiting the liability of cybersmear authors.142 Since then, additional
normative arguments have been offered in favor of the free speech de-
fense to defamation and limitations on that defense in the interests of
maintaining a higher level of discourse on the Internet.' The pre-
dominant argument can be found in Professor Lidsky's defense of
Robert C. Post's notions of defamation law'44 making meaningful dis-
course possible. 4 '
The normative argument justifying the limitations of free speech
analysis approaches the problem of cybersmear with the baggage of
predetermined normative values for defamation as protector of reputa-
tion. Drawing on Post's analysis of reputation as property, as honor,
and as dignity, Lidsky proposes a First Amendment regime for cy-
bersmear based entirely on the opinion privilege. While she does ar-
gue for expanded First Amendment protections for online John Does,
her predeterminations about relative valuation of expression constrain
her opinion privilege to little more than allowed by Milkovich.
Although case law is concerned with the harmed dignity of the
individual, corporate plaintiffs are ostensibly only concerned with fi-
nancial gain. While particular corporate officers may have their egos
bruised online, a corporate plaintiff, as the ultimate economically ra-
tional actor, pursues litigation only as long as it is good for business.
This means that while a corporation might not have a sense of dignity
per se, it does place a financial value in maintaining its reputation in
the eyes of the public, especially in the context of its stock price.
142. See Weber, supra note 123, at 237. ("[T]he Court's logic for requiring actual malice
protection is, at times, analogous to situations in which libel plaintiffs have been defamed by bul-
letin board speech.").
143. Lidsky, supra note 8, at 884 ("If John Doe is unscrupulous or merely reckless, how-
ever, he ... can pollute the information stream with defamatory falsehoods.").
144. Robert C. Post, New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation: The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986).
145. Lidsky, supra note 8, at 886.
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From this perspective, the decision whether to file a cybersmear suit is
entirely a cost-benefit analysis weighing the likely costs relative to the
gains and assets of the corporation. Since the corporation has much
greater financial resources, Lidsky says, "[i]t is tempting to portray the
new Internet libel suits as David versus Goliath battles, pitting ordi-
nary John Does against powerful corporate interests out to intimidate
their critics into silence." '146 But she argues that this is an inaccurate
portrayal because "[i]n the online world, every John Doe is potentially
a publisher" who, despite having the power to be heard by millions,
exercises a startling degree of recklessness in standards of information
to publish. 147
Turning to Post, Professor Lidsky says that the potential for
damage caused by John Does warrants limiting their free speech privi-
leges in defamation law because limitation "has the potential to curb
the excesses of Internet discourse and to make Internet discourse not
just more civil but more rational as well." '148 This shift occurs through
the chilling effect that defamation suits and the threat of defamation
suits have on speech. Here, Lidsky recognizes the danger that these
suits "may chill more than defamatory falsehoods,"' 49 but concludes
that this danger must be balanced against the fact that "[the suits]
make Internet users more temperate and more cautious about making
unsupported factual assertions"' ° and the ultimate worth of speech by
John Does in cybersmear."'
In the determination of the value of cybersmear speech, the con-
straints imposed on online speech by reliance on the opinion privilege
are most marked. By asserting that cybersmear speech has an inherent
value that must be weighed (and implying that it would not be
weighed heavily), Lidsky draws most heavily on Post's concept of
defamation law protecting reputation as dignity. For Post, dignity is
the opposite of individual autonomy because dignity is the result of
understandings gained from social interactions while autonomy is the
146. Id. at 883.
147. Id. at 884.
148. Id. at 887.
149. Id. at 890. The sentence reads, "There is some danger, therefore, that the growing
popularity of the new Internet libel suits may chill more defamatory falsehoods - it may also chill
the use of the Internet as a medium for free-ranging debate and experimentation with unpopular
or novel ideas." Id. (footnotes omitted).
150. Id. at 889.
151. Id. at 892 ("Thus, before lamenting the chill that defamation actions will have on the
John Does who frequent financial message boards, it is worthwhile to explore whether their
speech is worthy of First Amendment protection.") (emphasis added).
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result of self-realized understandings. 15 2  Concepts of dignity are
therefore inextricably linked to concepts of community."5 3 Limitations
imposed on speech in the name of dignity are then limitations in the
name of preservation of community. The reasoning is that defamation
law qua First Amendment behavior-norming boundaries also defines
the boundaries of a society.14 Exclusion of certain speech from First
Amendment protection maintains the definition of the society from
which that speech is excluded.' 5 Ultimately:
A community without boundaries is without shape or identity; if
pursued with single-minded determination, tolerance is incom-
patible with the very possibility of a community. For this reason
tolerance as an ideal is incomplete. If community life is to sur-
vive, on either the local or national level, tolerance must at some
point or another come to an end. Exactly where that point is de-
pends a great deal on the importance one attaches to the inten-
sity of community life and to the exercise of freedom of expres-
sion as a reflection of individual autonomy.'
5 6
In the context of cybersmear, Professor Lidsky paints an equally
bleak picture of the dangers of open boundaries of speech. Citing the
King James Bible,'57 she elaborates:
152. This conception is to be contrasting with Justice Harlan's conception of dignity in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where "[t]he constitutional 'premise of individual dig-
nity'... is thus a form of individual 'autonomy."' Post, supra note 144, at 734 (citing Cohen).
153. See Post, supra note 144, at 736. But see Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyber-
space, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1609 (1999) ("We have only begun to encounter the communi-
ties that cyberspace makes possible and to apply our legal principles and rules to the unique
situations created by Internet-enabled interactions.") [hereinafter Law of Cyberspace].
154. See Post, supra note 144, at 736.
155. Says Post: "Only a thoroughly demoralized society can tolerate everything." Id. at
736.
156. Id. at 736-37.
157. I mention her source not only for a facetious illustration of the culturally dependant
inspiration Lidsky draws from, but also out of genuine concern for the implications of this schol-
arship: her footnote presents a bona fide bible study. In the interest of fair play, I repeat her
words:
In the Tower of Babel account, the people of the earth began to build a tower "whose
top may reach unto heaven." Genesis 11:4 (King James). When God saw the tower,
he said:
Behold the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to
do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to
do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not
understand one another's speech
Id. 11:6-7 (King James). The next verses reveal the aftermath:
The Lord scattered the people abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth:
and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; be-
cause the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence
did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of the earth.
Id. 11:8-9
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But fostering a more participatory public discourse may come at
a high cost. Speech from a 'multitude of tongues' may lead to
truth, but it may also lead to the Tower of Babel. And the level
of discourse on the financial message boards also suggests that
fostering unmediated participation may make public discourse
not only less rational and less civil; it also runs the risk of mak-
ing public discourse meaningless. A discourse that has no nec-
essary anchor in truth has no value to anyone but the speaker,
and the participatory nature of Internet discourse threatens to
engulf its value as discourse."5 8
This justification of the limitation of free speech protection in
defamation allows protection of cybersmear defendants to be narrowed
to the weak opinion privilege. Although Lidsky advocates a return of
context analysis for online message board users"5 9 and urges courts to
"take an active role in dismissing cases at an early stage, '"16° the limita-
tions of this approach are clear: she offers no protections for the ano-
nymity of John Does. She admits this much, but discounts the chill-
ing effect of loss of anonymity as opposed to the threat of actual
litigation.'6 '
IV. GETTING THE 'CYBER' INTO CYBER-SLAPP
A. Technology and the Adaptation of Socio- Cultural Norms in the Law
While proponents of the opinion privilege in cybersmear argue
for "courts to extend to the new class of Internet libel defendants all of
the existing protections the First Amendment has to offer," '162 com-
mentators have long stressed that the onset of new technology necessi-
Lidsky, supra note 8, at 903 n.250.
And, to be somewhat facetious, is Lidsky representing that the morality of defamation law
dictates that cybersmear lawsuits exercise their God-like power by throwing us into cybernetic
confusion? Certainly not, if for no other reason than web content provider AltaVista has already
resolved the larger issues of this problem. AltaVista Translations, available at http://babelfish.
altavista.com (last visited Jul. 16, 2001).
158. Lidsky, supra note 8, at 902-03 (footnotes omitted).
159. Seeid.at938-39.
160. Id. at 944.
161. Id. at 890 n.179 ("The solution that I advocate in this Article does little to alleviate
the chill that flows solely from having one's identity revealed."). Professor Lidsky contrasts this
chill with "the far more serious chill that results from being forced to defend against a meritless
action." Id. However, in an amicus brief for Hvide v. Does I through 8, No. 99-2831 CA01 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1999), she helped the ACLU argue that anonymity in cybersmear was a constitutional
right. Brief of Amicus Curie American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Un-
ion of Florida, Hvide v. Does 1-8, No. 99-2831 CA01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. dated Feb. 18, 2000) avail-
able at http://www.aclufl.org/hvideamicus.html. See Lidsky, supra note 8.
162. Lidksy, supra note 8, at 944 (emphasis added).
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tates new rules of constitutional protections for speech. History pro-
vides innumerable examples of social and legal changes occurring in
response to technological development. Just a few of the technological
advances that provoked such change include the printing press, the
telegraph, the radio and television, and now the Internet. However, in
the case of the Internet, the adaptations of regulatory protections may
not be keeping up with the adaptations of socio-cultural values and
structures.1
63
Since theoretical bases for limiting defamation defense are rooted
in concepts of community, let us first look at the new kinds of com-
munities found on the Internet. Mike Godwin has proposed the
"meme of virtual communities164 based in large part on Howard
Rheingold's idea of "groupmind"' 6 and the social scientists Roxanne
Hiltz and Murray Turoffs study of "computer-mediated communica-
tion."'' 66 The genesis of the virtual community is the idea that the de-
sign of a communications system bears upon the development of the
community of system users. Drawing heavily from their experiences
on the WELL 67 system, Godwin and Rheingold describe a new set of
community dynamics which define values by different means, al-
though the actual elements of virtual community are not wholly unlike
elements of traditional community.
As a gathering place for conviviality, 168 the Internet provides a
level playing field where users can make up for the social nexus lost
163. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 1 (1983)
Civil liberty functions today in a changing technological context. For five hundred
years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries one, for the right of people to speak
and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled. But new technologies of
electronic communication may now relegate old and freed media such as pamphlets,
platforms, and periodicals to a comer of the public forum.... The new technologies
have not inherited all the legal immunities that were won for the old. ... And so, as
speech increasingly flows over those electronic media, the five-century growth of an
unabridged right of citizens to speak without controls may be endangered.
Id.
164. GODWIN, supra note 133, at 52. Originating from the work of humanist biologist
Richard Dawkins, a "meme" is conceptualized as a unit of cultural evolution. The archetypal
meme is a self-replicating idea that flows from person to person transmitting itself and the cul-
tural information it carries along with it. Memes thereby change social structures and conditions
and create new social institutions as individuals come in contact with them. See THE FREE ON-
LINE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING (Denis Howe, ed. 1993) available at http://www.foldoc.
org.
165. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 110 (1994).
166. GODWIN, supra note 133, at 32.
167. Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link. The WELL was one of the early public computer con-
versation systems that went beyond the local range of dial-in Bulletin Board Systems.
168. RHEINGOLD, supra note 165, at 25.
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when "the malt shop became a mall." '169 The Net grew as individuals
and groups of individuals connected to each other in a medium that
was, at first, highly structured, but unregulated and conducive to the
free flow of ideas. But a medium and a nexus are not necessarily all
that makes a community. Rheingold proposes that the shift from real
world community to online community is something akin to Emile
Durkheim's shift from gemeinschaft (premodern community) to gesell-
schaft (society).17° Closely tracking Godwin's meme of virtual com-
munities, the Durkheim shift is not a product of technological and so-
cial change, but an effect of changes manifesting in a "mass-
psychological transition" where individuals internalize the technologi-
cal and social structures produced by change.171 The measure of the
community, therefore, is that individuals "report... that they experi-
ence the feeling of being part of a community, and thus we should
judge their claims of community membership seriously."' 72
The Durkheim model implies that communities, real or virtual,
while defined and ordered to some degree by rules, cannot be changed
by exterior powers that are not accepted and internalized by individu-
als within the community.173 This assertion seems to run contrary to
the possibility that the normative claim of the civilizing "benefits" of
defamation law could be accurate.'74 Although, arguably, individuals
online do internalize the effects of a few cybersmear suits as deter-
rence, the fact that real world laws and lawsuits exist outside of the so-
cial structure of the online community at least mitigates if not elimi-
nates that effect.
One of the most important traits of the communities that do exist
online is the facile capability to keep personal information private.'
Professor Schwartz has called information privacy the second issue to
the access problem of the digital divide in terms of importance for de-
liberative democracy online.' 76 In order for democracy to be carried
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id. at 64-65.
171. See id. at 64; see also Larry R. Ridener, Dead Sociologists' Index: Emile Durkheim- The
Work, available at http://raven.jmu.edu/-ridenelr/DSS/INDEX.HTML#durkheim (last vis-
ited Jul. 16, 2001).
172. Law of Cyberspace, supra note 153, at 1590.
173. RHEINGOLD, supra note 165, at 64 ("A science of Net behavior is not going to re-
shape the way people behave online .... ).
174. See Lidsky, supra note 8, at 885-88.
175. I call this a "facile capability" because, while individuals engaged in discourse may be
immediately anonymous to each other, their true identities are determinable. The resulting
"anonymous feel" and perception of anonymous discourse creates operative, though not actual,
anonymity. Better said, anonymity or pseudonymity is "something much more possible in cyber-
space than in real space." Law of Cyberspace, supra note 153, at 1607 (emphasis added).
176. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1651.
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out online, individuals must be willing to speak. But individuals are
dissuaded from speaking when their words and activities are tracked
with no way for them to gauge who the trackers are and what informa-
tion they are gathering. 77 In this way, the Internet is often referred to
as a Hyde Park in London or the modern town square, where a
speaker on a soapbox can have his piece and participate in discourse.178
"Without information privacy, however, the implications of con-
gregating in the town square are dramatically changed." '179 The Su-
preme Court recognized the importance of anonymity in free and un-
fettered speech in the real world with McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,' and a federal district court recognized its importance
for cyberspace in ACLU of Georgia v. Miller.' In Miller, the court
found that anonymity should be protected on free speech grounds be-
cause identity is a component of speech." 2 In-so ordering, however,
the court noted their purpose was to make sure that expression was not
chilled.183
Miller turns an intellectual corner, in some sense, by opening the
door on the relative value of anonymity in cyberspace. Anonymity in
terms of personal privacy in the print world is well established, but
when applying real world doctrine to cyberspace, Professor Katsh in-
dicates that since "[i]t is clear that 'our paradigm of information has
been the book,"' then "experiences in cyberspace, and the expectations
and values fostered by this new environment, should be examined
along with judicial assessments of the relevance of past decisions and
experiences."' 84 The newly-encountered qualities of information in-
clude the fact that electronic information is not constrained to the
mortal coil of print-print spatial and temporal conceptions of expres-
sion do not apply. 8 "Cyberspace liberates information that had been
effectively hidden or inaccessible under print's regime and may em-
177. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized this much and pledged to protect the 'vast
democratic fora' of the Internet." Id. (citing ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997)).
178. Schwartz cites Benjamin Barber as saying "the public needs its town square." Id.
(footnotes omitted). Further, "In Benjamin Barber's vision, civil society is the free space in
which democratic attitudes are cultivated and conditioned." Id. (footnotes omitted). But see
Lidsky, supra note 8, at 885 ("'[A] civilized society,' as David Anderson has written, 'cannot re-
fuse to protect reputation."') (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
179. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1652.
180. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
181. 997 F. Supp. 1228 (ND. Ga. 1997).
182. See id. at 1232.
183. Id. at 1233.
184. M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amend-
ment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1692 (1995) (emphasis in original).
185. Id. at 1704.
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power groups or individuals whose communicative capabilities were
economically restricted in print culture."'86
The implications for defamation law are manifest and they are
many-fold. While "uncivilized" discourse threatens whenever histori-
cally mute groups or individuals shake the boat of public perception,
the entrance of new classes of speakers, and entirely new classes of
speech, onto the scene requires that rules previously applied exclu-
sively to the old classes be thoroughly re-examined. Given the unique
nature of the Internet for fostering open and honest debate, the value
of hearing the new speakers far outweighs any damage, dignitary or
otherwise, that simply letting them speak without fear could do.
As a New York judge, invoking Justice Holmes's dissent in
Abrams,187 wrote:
Do not underestimate the common man. People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They
can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can
evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they
are permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And then,
once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is "respon-
sible", what is valuable, and what is truth.
88
Applying this ideal to the Internet, Professor Schwartz predicted:
Cyberspace has the potential to emerge as an essential focal
point for communal activities and political participation. This
development would help counter several negative trends in the
United States. Voter turnout is declining; membership in many
kinds of traditional voluntary associations is sinking; and a sense
of shared community is frayed. Information technology in gen-
eral and the Internet in particular have the potential to reverse
these trends by forming new links between people and marshal-
ling these connections to increase collaboration in democratic
life.' 89
186. Id. at 1715.
187. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
188. State v. Duryea, 76 Misc.2d 948, 966 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1974). The Supreme Court
also cites this perspicuous excerpt in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.l
(1995).
189. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1648 (footnotes omitted). One cannot help but note the
record voter turnout in many areas for the 2000 presidential election and ask whether the
proliferation of the Internet had any causal relationship.
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B. Applying SLAPP to Cybersmear: The Last Vestige of Privacy
The change in the locus of social control, alluded to above, from
the state to private service providers necessitates a change in our ap-
proach to privacy:
From the earliest days of the Republic, American law viewed the
government as the entity whose data use raises the greatest
threat to individual liberty .... This approach means that treat-
ment of personal information in the private sector is often unac-
companied by the presence of basic legal protections. Yet, pri-
vate enterprises now control more powerful resources of
information technology than ever before. These organizations'
information processing contributes to their power over our lives.
As the Internet becomes more central to life in the United
States, the weaknesses and illogic of this existing legal model for
information privacy are heightened. 9'
While cyberspace controls might exist almost completely within
the grip of private ventures, the companies that earn their revenue
from those ventures exist very much in the real world. In the real
world, the state still has ultimate power. Though the state would most
likely prefer to see online service providers police themselves, the state
is ultimately responsible, by virtue of its power, for the conduct of
these companies and the protection of each citizen's privacy.
To adequately protect online John Does from civil discovery
proceedings, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that the val-
ues of anonymous speech are not compromised by frivolous, retalia-
tory litigants. Anti-SLAPP rules protect against just such lawsuits in
the context of First Amendment petition rights.
Typically, SLAPP suits "are suits that chill, stifle and intimidate
expressions by citizens attempting to participate in governmental ac-
tivity and public policy."'' Most anti-SLAPP laws prohibit suits that
infringe upon a citizen's First Amendment right to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances.' 92 In California, home to one of the
country's stronger anti-SLAPP laws, "[a] cause of action against a per-
son arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's
right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
190. Id. at 1633-34 (footnotes omitted).
191. California Anti-SLAPP Project, Proposed Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation , available
at http://www.sirius.com/-casp/halt.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2001).
192. The California Anti-SLAPP Project hosts a good deal of background information on
the California law. California Anti-SLAPP Project, available at http://www.sirius.com/-casp/
(last visited Jul. 16, 2001).
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special motion to strike." '193 This free speech language, also found in
some other state statutes, broadens anti-SLAPP laws to cover plaintiff
actions outside of a complaint, hearing or adjudicative process.'94
California case law, in combination with the above-quoted statute, §
425.16, indicates that protected speech includes all speech with any
perceivable connection to a public, legal, or electoral process.195 Addi-
tionally, there is "a well-established body of California case law which
allows nonparties to civil litigation (such as a newspaper) to assert the
constitutionally-protected rights of an author to remain unknown.'
19 6
Presumably, this third party right would extend to online service pro-
viders as well as a newspaper.
In order for a plaintiff to survive a special motion to strike under
§ 425.16, the court must determine "that the plaintiff has established a
probability that he or she will prevail on the claim," with the com-
plaint and supplemental affidavits.'97 In Wilcox v. Superior Court,
98
the showing of "probability" of success was not satisfied by the cross-
complainant despite the court's minimal requirements.'99 The court
held that "reasonable probability of success means only that the plain-
tiff must demonstrate the complaint is legally sufficient and supported
by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. 200 Al-
though the cross-complainant argued that supporting facts need not
be admissible evidence, the court stressed that the evidence must be
submitted and therefore admissible or at least unopposed. 20' The
cross-complaint was dismissed because it was wholly founded in hear-
say.20
2
SLAPP suits are not only characterized by actions in relation to a
pending authorized official matter. One characteristic that SLAPP
plaintiffs share squarely with abusive cybersmear plaintiffs is that both
easily hurdle the judicial barriers of failing to prevail on meritless suits
because both have no intention of winning; rather, the costs of litiga-
193. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 425.16(b)(1).
194. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 10 § 8136 (a)(3) (1994).
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) ("this section shall be considered broadly"); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) ("any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open
to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest").
196. Rancho Publ'ns v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1541 (4th Dist. App. Ct.
1999).
197. CAL. CIv. PROC.CODE§ 425.16 (b)(3).
198. 27 Cal. App. 4th 809 (1994).
199. Id. at 827-28.
200. Id. at 823.
201. Id. at 830.
202. Id.
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tion are ordinary business costs in pursuit of business goals. 2 3  The
subject matter of anti-SLAPP law being acts in furtherance of rights of
petition or speech on a public issue is also similar to the defendant's
speech in cybersmear. °4
To the extent that there are subtle differences between the typical
SLAPP action and its cybersmear counterpart, the normative values of
taking full advantage of the democratizing nature of the Internet
should be considered. 2 ' The benefits of online "John Doe-ism" must
be balanced against the need of legitimate civil litigants to pursue ac-
tion against their harmers. In the context of online anonymity, "it is
clear that the balance should be weighed heavily toward the preserva-
tion of free and unfettered online expression.
20 6
Anti-SLAPP laws as procedural rules are ideally suited to resolve
issues of abuse cybersmear. If cybersmear plaintiffs have a burden to
show that they have a probability of prevailing on the claim, frivolous
suits will not be allowed to go forward. But that does not protect the
defendant's privacy. SLAPP motions must still be brought by the de-
fendant, necessitating his or her identification through plaintiffs at-
tempts to comply with notice requirements, or at least ceding jurisdic-
tion. Once again, a defendant who has not been notified of the
proceeding cannot very well challenge a subpoena. If the defendant
203. Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commen-
tary on its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 805 (2000) ("A SLAPP plaintiff..
expects to lose and is willing to write off litigation expenses (and even attorney's fees where nec-
essary) as the cost of doing business. Thus, the existing safeguards did not serve as a deter-
rent .... ).
204. The allowable subject matter under the California statute has been a flashpoint of
some debate. After initial litigation and amendments to the law, the defining ruling came from
the California State Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Councilfor Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th
1106 (1999), saying, in effect, that there must be an official proceeding involved on some level
(The upshot of the decision, however, was that: "Under section 425.16, a defendant moving to
strike a cause of action arising from a statement made before, or in connection with an issue un-
der consideration by, a legally authorized official proceeding need not separately demonstrate
that the statement concerned an issue of public significance." Id. at 1123). The court stressed
that there was no bright-line rule for determining how, or if, a statement was related to a public
issue, and a recent appellate ruling has held that as little as an issue's newsworthiness may de-
termine if it is of public interest (See Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299 (1999)).
See Tate, supra note 203, at 825-28. The broadening of "public interest" in Marich is especially
notable considering that the California State Supreme Court's ruling in Briggs narrowed the
definition in spite of the legislative history of the unanimously approved 1997 amendment
declaring: "the additional declaration of legislative intent would strengthen the statute against
narrow readings of its protections ...." SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SB 1296 BILL ANALYSIS
(June 23, 1997) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_1251-
1300/sb_1 296_cfa_19970516_131510_senfloor.html.
205. In addition to simply balancing the relative values of speech and righting harms, it
also bears noting that the democratizing mission of Internet regulation may bring some qualita-
tive value on John Doe-ism to the equation.
206. Sobel, supra note 2, at 17.
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cannot act on her own behalf (and we are assured that the plaintiff will
not either), then the court must act to preserve the defendant's rights
and prevent chilling of speech.
The model for such court activism can be found in Seescandy.com
and Dendrite.2°7 Anti-SLAPP statutes, Seescandy.com, and its progeny
all allocate a substantially similar burden of proof to the entity seeking
disclosure in the interest of protecting the rights of the entity about
whom information is sought.211 In Seescandy.com, the court required a
minimal showing of facts to the end that the complaint under which
the subpoena is sought is non-frivolous. 29 To overcome a motion to
strike under an anti-SLAPP statute, the complainant must plead suffi-
cient facts so that, if proven, the complaint would be sustained.210 In
each case, the essential burden is a prima facie showing that the disclo-
sure is necessary for a valid reason. By these simple procedural
mechanisms, courts have, to some degree, been able to weed out
abuses of the power of the law to invade privacy.
The similar analysis engaged in by the courts in SLAPP and Doe
defendant cases highlights the similarities in circumstances between
the two situations. The antagonist in each situation is the entity or
force that has the potential to upend the rights of an innocent party if
abused. The courts, in both situations, have seen the potential for
abuse and saw fit to mitigate that potential with additional limitations
on the law or rule involved. While the necessity of limiting govern-
ment action against the rights of citizens has long been a hallmark of
American jurisprudence, the courts, in cases like Seescandy.com and
Dendrite, have only recently recognized the equal or greater potential
for abuse by private litigants and the need to curtail it.
207. In Seescandy.com, the court proceeded sua sponte, developing the four-part test for
discovery against unknown defendants. Supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. In Dendrite,
the court applied the Seescandy.com test and declined to grant plaintiffs discovery request. Su-
pra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
208. James E. Grossberg & Dee Lord, California's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 13 COMM. LAW.
3, 5 ("The statute provides that the motion shall be granted unless a plaintiff 'establishes by
pleading and affidavit a 'probability' of prevailing' on its claim.") (citations omitted); Sees-
candy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 ("plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that plain-
tiffs suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss").
209. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578.
210. See Grossberg & Lord, supra note 208 at 5-6.
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V. OTHER SOLUTIONS
A. Industry "Self-Regulation": Contract Solution
Since the relationship between consumer and corporation is pri-
marily controlled by contract terms, reforms in privacy protection
could start with self-regulatory moves to provide adequate contracts.
Industry self-regulation has three benefits above government interven-
tion: (1) the companies supplying the technology are in the best posi-
tion to determine potential privacy threats and propose contractual so-
lutions; (2) keeping in step with technological changes requires a speed
of action that the corporate environment can maintain, but the gov-
ernment cannot; and (3) industry forces seek to avoid legislative action
restricting their activities at all costs.
21'
In approaching the contract solution to privacy protection from
civil subpoenas, two issues must be addressed. First, privacy policies
must limit disclosure due to "legal process" to only court-ordered
subpoenas. This requirement would help eliminate the practice of
corporations filing frivolous suits aimed only at discovering the iden-
tity of online posters. Instead of plaintiff attorneys simply serving
subpoenas as officers of the court, plaintiffs would be required to seek
some degree of judicial approval to override privacy, which would
screen out entirely frivolous cases. Second, privacy policies must allow
for notice to subscribers prior to disclosure of their information. This
would allow subscribers to challenge the disclosure and help to elimi-
nate collusion between corporate plaintiffs and corporate online ser-
vice providers.
B. Federal Mandate: Procedural and Substantive Law
While industry self-regulation may be the preferred method of
approaching privacy issues, the shortcomings of contract reform on its
own are fairly evident. First, even though requiring a court order to
proceed with disclosure will add badly-needed judicial oversight to the
subpoena process, the contract cannot determine the considerations
that a court should undertake in granting that order. Second, it may
be presumptuous to expect corporate interests to work together in
good faith on behalf of the consumer. Regardless, it is obvious that
whatever the contract between the online service providers and sub-
211. The public interest is not necessarily served by restrictions because restrictions can
chill innovation and online freedom (as with encryption export restrictions), and the threat of
legislative action can always be held over respective corporate "heads" to invoke action on their
part, while legislative action, once taken, can typically be worked around.
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scribers, it will have to work in concert with the courts to provide a
comprehensive solution.
1. Changes to Federal Subpoena Rules212
Perhaps the most compelling solution is to change the rules of
civil procedure to address the privacy requirements of the online envi-
ronment. The judiciary has long grappled with the undefined gray
area of Doe parties in federal court, and its responses have varied
widely.213 But there is a solid rule in case law for John Does online-
Seescandy.com and the New Jersey appellate decision, Dendrite-as
well as other federal cases like 2TheMart.com. Changes to FRCP 45
that codify these holdings would most likely provide adequate privacy
protections for online Does in federal court. As with the Sees-
candy.com sua sponte decision, the heightened criteria for discovery in
online Doe cases places additional burden upon the court to identify
the circumstances and apply the rule on its own volition. While this is
somewhat unusual in our adversarial system, it is certainly not un-
heard of.214 Courts have long provided special consideration and assis-
tance for disadvantaged parties such as pro se litigants.21 In keeping
with that practice, changes in the Rules would give courts a more pro-
active role in discovery against Doe defendants.
First, Rule 45 should be amended to not allow blank subpoenas
to attorneys where the defendant is unknown or known only by an
online pseudonym. Second, the considerations for issuing a subpoena
should be the four-part test for Seescandy.com,"6 similar to the ECPA
restrictions on government-sought warrants, standards in SLAPP
suits and constitutional protections. Third, should they become aware
of the litigation through other means, Doe defendants must be permit-
ted to make a special appearance to quash a subpoena that attempts to
discovery their identity. Currently, an attempt to quash a subpoena
cedes personal jurisdiction; however, defendants can make a special
appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction. Still, discovery into the
identity of a Doe is often necessary to show personal jurisdiction.
212. Although this section only addresses the federal rules, it does so with the consideration
that most state court rules are analogous and that analogous changes in those rules would yield
analogous benefits.
213. See Epstein, supra note 53.
214. Judicial oversight is extremely important in litigation against online John Does be-
cause of the great potential for abuse of the discovery process. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 21.
215. See generally, Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1988).
216. SeeSobelsupra note 2 at 22 n.35.
[Vol. 25:213
Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP
The need for a special appearance rule also shows the need for
the fourth element-a notice requirement. Obviously, a defendant
cannot appear to challenge a subpoena if she does not have notice that
the suit has been filed or discovery commanded. While it would be
unprecedented for the FRCP to require a third-party subpoena recipi-
ent to serve notice on a party to the suit, notice must be given by the
online service provider to the Doe in order for the intent of Rule 45 to
be fulfilled. The company being served is the only party that typically
possesses the immediate means for contacting a defendant.217 Under
these circumstances, it would be much more helpful if the contract
terms of the subscriber agreement provided for notice under these cir-
cumstances. While the court could order notice to be given by the
online service provider, allocating the plaintiffs service of process
burden to a third party is undesirable. Ideally, contract reform and
procedure reform in this area would be symbiotic.
2. New Substantive Law
The fundamental problem with changing the FRCP as a com-
prehensive solution is that the Rules only apply in federal courts.
There is no reason to think that cybersmear litigation is confined to
the federal system; in fact, it may be more often litigated in the state
courts.21a Substantive federal law, however, could be applicable to all
actions, federal and state. Substantive legislation aimed at protecting
defendants like online John Does has already been enacted in the form
of the ECPA. However, as stated above, these laws are only aimed at
protecting against traditional Fourth Amendment violations. As such,
they fall well short of protecting the privacy of civil defendants.
While the ECPA currently includes restrictions on civil discov-
ery of electronic communications, subscriber information is explicitly
not covered. 219 The call to expand the law's protections to limit civil
discovery of subscriber information has already been sounded.2  Pre-
vious suggestions include many of the solutions enumerated here, in-
cluding requiring a court order for disclosure of personally identifiable
information, requiring notice to the subscriber, and judicial over-
217. One court has pursued a different, novel solution to the notice problem; in Dendrite
Int., the trial court issued a sua sponte order for the plaintiff to post notice of the lawsuit on the
message board where the offending comments were originally posted. Dendrite Int., No. MRS C-
129-00, at 8.
218. As noted above, cybersmear cases and their like usually have tort or breach of contract
causes of action, usually only actionable in federal court with diversity jurisdiction.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(1)(A) (1994).
220. Sobel, supra note 2, at 19.
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sight. 221 But perhaps the most persuasive argument for substantive
law protecting Does online is an already existing example-the protec-
tions granted personal data controlled by cable companies.222
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and the amend-
ing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 included significant protections for subscriber information. In
fact, the restrictions placed on law enforcement to get a warrant for
personally identifiable information under the Cable Act are greater
than those imposed by the ECPA. Under the Cable Act, a govern-
ment entity can obtain a warrant if "(1) such entity offers clear and
convincing evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably
suspected of engaging in criminal activity and that the information
sought would be material evidence in the case; and (2) the subject of
the information is afforded the opportunity to appear and contest such
entity's claim." 223 On the other hand, under the ECPA, a government
entity must only present "specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. ,
224
Further differentiated from the ECPA, the Cable Act places re-
strictions on civil discovery, authorizing disclosure "made pursuant to
a court order authorizing such disclosure, if the subscriber is notified
of such order by the person to whom the order is
directed. ' 22' The court order requirement and the notice requirement
closely mirror desirable changes to the ECPA. In addition, case law
interpreting the Cable Act has noted that Congress, in enacting the
Act, was concerned with the privacy implications of "two-way" com-
munications systems that can collect a great deal more informationabout subscribers. 226 Those types of legislative concerns lend them-
selves to online applications.
Litigation has found one chink in the armor that the Cable Act
provides cable subscribers' privacy-lawsuits by cable companies
against their own customers for pirating cable signals. In keeping with
the legislative intent, courts have held that information collected by
monitoring cable lines for the electromagnetic signatures of illegal de-
221. Id. at 19-21 (Sobel also calls for judicial discretion when the defendant has received
notice but not made an appearance).
222. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1675.
223. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (h) (note the notice requirement implicated by subsection (2)) (1994).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (d) (1994).
225. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c)(2)(B) (1994).
226. Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 973 F.2d 874, 880 n.7 (10th Cir. 1992)
("[L]egislative history reveals that Congress was chiefly concerned with the privacy implications
of two-way systems.").
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scramblers (by means of a "Time Domain Reflectometer") is not nec-
essarily personally identifiable information and can, at any rate, be
disclosed in the prosecution of cable piracy without fear of liability.
27
This concern does not need to be dealt with here, however, as the
technology that facilitates the Internet does not provide an analogous
potential for piracy of Internet service or special devices to facilitate
piracy.
A legislative solution of substantive law could clearly make way
for the judicial oversight and notice required to protect John Doe pri-
vacy in civil discovery. However, as with each of the other solutions
proposed, a substantive law solution has its weaknesses and is some-
what dependant on the other solutions. Undoubtedly, a parallel to the
Cable Act for online service providers would be able to raise the bar
on permissible subpoenas against a Doe defendant, but the notice
element is still troubling. The Cable Act requires that the cable com-
pany give notice to the subscriber about the information it collects,
but it does not prescribe a notice period for a challenge to the disclo-
sure (although an "opportunity to contest" is called for when a gov-
ernment entity submits a subpoena, still a stronger rule than the
ECPA).228
Also, there are significant differences between the Internet and
cable television. First, cable companies tend to be the direct suppliers
of cable content and services to the subscriber; as such, they have con-
tact information such as an address and phone number that an online
service provider might not have. Without that information, notice re-
quirements are more difficult to comply with. For example, Yahoo!
might only have an IP address as personally identifiable information.
Second, even though cable systems may be seen as "two-way" sys-
tems, legislators may be less willing to apply strong protections to a
media where the subscriber can conduct extensive activities and po-
tentially harm others.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the wide variety of strategies that John Doe defendants
and authors have put forward for protecting anonymous speech, courts
do not consistently uphold users' privacy rights .1 9 As a procedural
227. Metrovision of Livonia, Inc. v. Wood, 864 F. Supp 675, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
228. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (a) (1994).
229. Recent court decisions are showing a certain propensity for protection of online speech
and prohibiting cybersmear subpoenas by corporate plaintiffs on free speech grounds. See Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
The Internet is a truly democratic forum for communication. It allows for the free ex-
change of ideas at an unprecedented speed and scale. For this reason, the constitu-
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matter, anti-SLAPP doctrine employed by a pro-active bench pro-
vides a consistent basis for protecting not only a defendant's free
speech rights, but his or her privacy rights. By preserving privacy,
courts maintain the pseudo-anonymous environment that has allowed
online speech to flourish. The social benefits of this speech are only
beginning to be recognized, but the cost of limiting it is the chilling
effect foreseen by many. Through understanding the nature of the
Internet and the online community, social and legal regimes can de-
velop and capitalize on anonymous speech, rather than perceive
anonymous speech as a threat. As the possibilities for online commer-
cial ventures seem to be crumbling, perhaps it behooves us to remem-
ber that when the Internet first became open to the public it was sim-
ply a forum for ideas, and users signed on to hear and be heard.
tional rights of Internet users, including the First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously, must be carefully safeguarded. Courts should impose a high threshold on
subpoena requests that encroach on this right.
Id. at 1091 (with this justification, the court applied the Seescandy.com four-part test); Global
Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
[Vol. 25:213
